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This chapter explores the reasons why, despite considerable convergence in 
the economic policy preferences and policies of the mainstream Left 
(principally Socialist Party) and Right, economic policy remained a major 
subject of debate during the 2002 election campaigns.  Convergence had 
taken place thanks to the relatively successful pursuit by the Jospin 
Government of moderately rigorous policies and a cautious liberalisation 
over the previous five years which corresponded to the longest period of 
strong economic growth (1998 to 2001) since the late 1980s.  The 2002 
elections reflected the now well-established trend of an incumbent Socialist 
leadership to lean towards moderation on economic policies (as in 1986 and 
1993).  Furthermore, not constrained by any joint election manifesto with 
other parties of the Left, the Socialists demonstrated much greater 
moderation on economic policy than in the 1997 legislative elections, with 
the party’s modernising wing firmly in control of the preparation of the 
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Jospin campaign platform.  Jospin and the Socialists refused to make any 
grand economic gestures to placate left-wing sentiments, promising no 
major cuts to income and corporate tax rates and, unlike 1997, refusing to 
advocate any questioning of the EU macro-economic policy constraints to 
which the Plural-Left government had committed itself.  At the same time, 
fearing the loss of votes to the smaller parties of the Left, Jospin and the 
Socialists avoided advocating any policies that could be interpreted in terms 
of 'liberalisation'.   
Despite the economic slowdown since 2001, the state of the economy 
did not provide fertile ground for President Chirac and the political 
opposition in the context of the electoral partisan debate.  Issues raised by 
Chirac and the UMP indicated, however, that the mainstream Right was 
willing to move in a cautiously liberal direction in the context of electoral 
politics:  major cuts to income and corporate taxes which became — along 
with tackling crime — the most vaunted election promise of Chirac’s 
campaign and that of the UMP; relaxing the application of the 35 hour week 
policy (but not scrapping it) and introducing  new  schemes to encourage 
individual savings for retirement (which Chirac even dared to label ‘fonds de 
pension à la française’).  However, at the same time, Chirac played the rebel 
on economic policy, challenging the constraints of the Euro-zone’s Stability 
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and Growth Pact especially given that these constraints made the fulfilment 
of his promises on tax cuts and government spending unrealistic. 
 After a brief overview of the economic policy of the Jospin-led 
Government, this chapter explores the leading candidates’ policy positions 
on the five major economic issues of the election campaign:   tax; 
government spending and respecting the Stability Pact deficit rules; the 35 
hour week and employment policy more generally; pensions reform and the 
privatisation of the remaining state owned utilities.  This chapter concludes 
by demonstrating the failure of the two leading candidates — and most of 
the other candidates — and their parties to spell out a coherent economic 
agenda that delineated the desirable role of the state in relation to the market 
economy in the Twenty-first century. 
 It should be noted that the policy positions of the presidential 
candidates on economic matters had considerable significance in terms of 
setting the tone for their party’s campaign positions.  Few new economic 
policy ideas were presented by the parties in the campaign for the legislative 
elections following the second ballot of the presidential elections.  Policy 
positions during the legislative campaign reiterated policies presented by the 
presidential candidates and their teams and focused upon President Chirac’s 
own promises and the ability of the UMP government to carry them out and 
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the reiteration of presidential candidate policies.  For this reason, most of the 
analysis presented in this chapter focuses upon the policy positions and 
debates of the presidential candidates prior to the first ballot of the 
presidential elections.  At the same time, it is recognised that the policy 
positions of the parties occasionally diverged from those of the leader.  For 
example, the Socialist Party campaign document, prepared by Martine 
Aubry, better reflected the views of the party’s left, while Jospin’s platform 
was prepared entirely by the ‘modernising wing’.  
  
The Jospin Government's economic policies 
The major lines of the economic policy pursued by the Jospin Government 
can be summarised as follows:  privatisation, controls on state spending, the 
maintenance of high corporate and personal income taxes despite some cuts 
from 2000, and the 35 hour week — the major legitimising policy for a 
government trying to prove its left-wing credentials — to be applied to all 
companies by 2002.
1
  The privatisation and budget cutting policies of the 
Plural Left Government were made necessary to enable France to participate 
in Stage Three of EMU.  However, even without EMU, the privatisation of 
state owned companies and banks was being pushed by the ‘modernising’, 
‘social-liberal’ wing of the Socialist Party, led by Finance Minister Laurent 
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Fabius and the former finance minister, Dominique Strauss-Kahn 
(commonly known as DSK).  At the June 1997 European Council in 
Amsterdam, the newly elected Jospin Government confirmed the Juppé 
government's commitment to the Stability and Growth Pact.  Over the next 
five years, the Jospin Government succeeded in privatisating more state 
assets, in terms of revenue, than the three previous conservative 
governments combined (Chirac, 1986-88; Balladur, 1993-95; Juppé, 1995-
97); this despite the presence of Communist members and various other 
professed opponents of capitalism within the governing coalition. 
In 1997, the Jospin Government agreed to its Broad Medium Term 
Economic Policy Guidelines (required by the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Stability Pact) which committed it to balancing the budget by 2002 (later 
pushed back to 2004).  Despite election promises in 1997 to pursue a more 
'activist' budgetary strategy and end budget cuts and the initial freeze of the 
post-electoral period, the Plural Left succeeded in making some minor cuts 
to state spending, principally through defence spending and the partial 
replacement of retiring staff.  With one of the largest public administrations 
in Europe in terms of percentage of total jobs, cuts to staff numbers had been 
widely recommended. The Picq report of 1994 established the goal of 
replacing only one in three civil servants retiring from the administration in 
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order to reduce the total number of staff to the 1980 level: a 15 per cent cut.  
In 1997, a secret reform written by two Financial Inspectors on over-
employment (waste and inefficiency) in the public sector was suppressed but 
leaked to the Canard Enchaîné, weekly newspaper.  The Balladur and Juppé 
governments postponed cuts given record high levels of unemployment, and 
the strong and militant trade-union presence in the public sector, led by 
Force Ouvrière.  Under the Plural-Left government, the short-lived Finance 
Minister Christian Sautter even failed in his efforts to decrease the 
excessively large number of tax administrators in his own ministry due to 
Jospin’s unwillingness to take on the unions and disenchant the Socialist 
electorate, found in disproportionately large numbers in the public sector.  
Sautter was replaced by the more politically astute former Prime Minister 
Laurent Fabius, who put all such cuts on hold.   Relatively strong economic 
growth during its first three and a half years in office enabled the Jospin 
Government to delay more substantial, sustainable cuts until after the 2002 
elections.  On the right, just prior to the 1997 National Assembly elections, 
the UDF Minister of Finance Jean Arthuis promised to reduce personnel and 
even to change the budget ordinance of 1959 in order to prohibit a deficit on 
current expenditure.
2
  However, the Jospin Government continued to delay 
total staff cuts.  It used staff replacement as a political device to demonstrate 
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its commitment to job creation in the public sector, allied with temporary 
youth employment schemes, notably emplois jeunes. 
The Jospin Government maintained the rhetoric of margin of 
manoeuvre in macroeconomic policy — vital for maintaining legitimacy on 
the left
3
 — initially promising an increase of 1 per cent in government 
expenditure (although in the government's December 1998 stabilisation plan 
this was qualified to cover the 2000-3 period or slightly more than .3 per 
cent per year which would allow the lowering of the deficit in line with the 
2004 balanced budget target), whereas the Juppé Government had sought an 
expenditure freeze and the RPR and UDF in opposition criticised the 
government for its inability to respect its balanced budget target.  The 
unexpectedly large budget revenue in 2000 due to stronger than predicted 
economic growth — the 'cagnotte' — allowed increases in government 
spending and tax cuts.  How much of each proved to be one of the most 
significant ideologically-driven economic debates within the Plural Left 
coalition and with the opposition.  Jospin was prevented from using this 
money to further reduce the deficit by the Socialist left and the coalition 
partners, with the 2002 elections in view — thus setting up future 
governments for failure to meet the 2004 balanced budget aim.  Elements of 
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the Right, notably the UDF, challenged Plural-Left policy on this, with the 
proposal of a balanced budget law. 
The Jospin Government maintained comparatively high corporate and 
income taxes (French corporate and income taxes are among the highest in 
the OECD) while taking the opportunity afforded by unexpectedly strong 
economic growth to make a limited number of small tax cuts.  The 'cagnotte' 
provided some scope for action in this area.  Fabius sought to prioritise 
income tax cuts — the first in 15 years was announced on 31 August 2000 
— but was constrained by the Socialist left and the Plural Left coalition 
partners.  These tax reductions benefited all income groups, but were 
designed ostensibly to benefit in particular the least well off.  There were 
also moderate cuts in corporate tax rates, with the explicit aim of stimulating 
further economic growth which in turn would lower the deficit.  Nearly all 
of the Right — from mainstream to extreme — pushed for much more 
significant cuts.  Nonetheless, on 12 March 2002, INSEE published the 
public administration accounts for 2001, showing that the Jospin 
Government had succeeded in bringing the total tax burden to almost its 
1996 level (44.9 per cent of GDP).
4
 
Interventionist employment policies was the core area in which the 
Socialist-led government could demonstrate its commitment to maintaining 
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the activist state-led approach of ‘modern socialism’.
5
  Employment creation 
is a particularly sensitive political matter for French governments given the 
high rate of unemployment, which reached 12.4 per cent in 1997.  The 
relatively strong economic growth of the 1998-2000 period brought down 
the official unemployment rate to 8.7 per cent by 2001 (16.4 per cent for the 
under 25s according to the government's May figures), for which the 
government was quick to credit its interventionist measures.  There has been 
a marked difference between the Left and Right in France on employment 
policy.   Governments of both the Left and Right had previously pursued 
voluntary measures to create jobs, temporarily reducing social charges and 
paying wages for companies which took on additional staff.
6
  The Left was 
more prone to creating special temporary government jobs, while there were 
elements in conservative governments that sought more orthodox solutions 
to  lower unemployment: in 1993/4, the Balladur Government sought to 
introduce a special minimum wage for young people (the contrat d’insertion 
professionnelle (CIP) known commonly as the SMIC jeune) which was 
withdrawn after violent protests.  From 1997, the Plural Left Government 
opted for more interventionist measures:  it established hundreds of 
thousands of special low-paid and temporary contracts for young people in 
the public sector (emplois-jeunes) and embraced the mandatory 35-hour 
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week policy.  The problematic logic behind the 35-hour week made the 
policy controversial, with the RPR and UDF and the MEDEF (patronat, the 
peak association for big business) resolutely opposed.  The Jospin 
Government was also at the forefront of the development of a European 
employment policy but given British, German and Spanish opposition, the 
Employment chapter which was included in the Amsterdam Treaty at 
Jospin's insistence, only amounted to open co-ordination, information 
sharing and non-binding targets. 
There was a strong element of party politics and ideological 
legitimation to this activism on employment policy.  The Jospin Government 
sought to distinguish itself from its conservative predecessors while after 
their disastrous defeat in the 1993 legislative elections, the Socialists had 
also swung to the left.  Within the party, the left-wing insisted upon more 
radical action on employment.  In April 1997, despite strong opposition 
from the right-wing of the party (including the future prime minister Jospin 
and ministers of finance, Strauss-Kahn and Fabius) the Socialists voted for 
their interventionist policies as campaign policy.  The Socialists were also 
encouraged to accept a more radical employment policy in the context of 
their joint elections manifesto with the Communists, the Greens and the 
MDC.  Following its June 1997 election victory, the legitimising importance 
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of the Plural Left’s activist employment policy increased, given that the 
governing coalition soon substantially watered down or cancelled most of 
the more radical policies that it had promised in its elections manifesto.  The 
35-hour week policy was also manageable financially, in that it would not 
contribute to the public sector deficit.  Government activism on employment 
was also aimed to address the gradual rise in the political action of the 
unemployed themselves and their supporters.  Putting the policy into effect 
proved troublesome for the government even in its own left-wing 
constituency:  the government initially promised that the drop in four hours 
from the work week would not coincide with a decline in pay but faced with 
the need to increase labour market flexibility and lower unemployment, the 
government allowed companies to freeze wages in the context of collective 
agreements with trade unions.  Thus, as a legitimising device the 35-hour 
week proved problematic.     
President Chirac and politicians in the RPR and UDF criticised the 
Plural Left's policies as excessively interventionist and too restraining on 
companies.  However, at the same time, few elements of the Right were 
willing to embrace a more far-reaching reform of the labour market that 
Anglo-American observers frequently recommended (notably a decrease in 
the minimum wage and increased flexibility with regard to hiring and 
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firing).  In fact, the 35 hour week policy was praised by some precisely 
because it resulted in 'increased flexibility' through the backdoor:  allowing 
companies to freeze wages and increase the flexibility of working time 
through an annualisation of the 35 hour week. 
 
Partisan debate on the economy during the 2002 election campaigns 
Although economic growth had begun to decrease from mid-2001, given the 
relatively low rate of unemployment, the relatively buoyant consumer 
confidence and the apparent success of the Jospin government's liberalising 
reforms, the presidential candidates of the mainstream Right and their parties 
were not a strong position to challenge Jospin and the Plural Left on their 
management of the economy.  Nor were the Green, Pôle Républicain and 
PCF presidential candidates and parties, given their collusion in the 
privatisations, budgetary restraint and the problematic employment policies 
of the Plural Left Government.  Likewise, Jospin and Chirac sought to 
appeal to each other’s voters in the centre ground of French politics and 
there was a marked blurring of their economic policy positions.  Despite 
determined efforts by the two leading candidates to distinguish themselves 
from one another during the campaign, the policy implications of Jospin's 
'modern socialism'
7
 and Chirac's mixed free market ideas alongside state 
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interventionism — the President refused to label himself a ‘liberal’ despite 
advocating liberalising reforms and despite criticising the ‘embedded 
socialism’ in France — often appeared very much the same.  The other 
candidates of the Left, presented their opposition to liberalising reforms; 
while candidates of the Right advocated further liberalisation.  Only the 
unashamedly liberal Alain Madelin and the candidates of the Extreme Left 
and Right offered anything in the way of a dramatic departure from the 
status quo.   
Nonetheless, despite the degree of convergence in economic policy, 
there were marked differences in the positions of the mainstream Left and 
Right candidates on economic policy issues during the presidential elections 
campaign which followed into the legislative election campaign.  The two 
leading presidential candidate positions themselves to appeal to particular 
elements of French society:  Jospin sought to appeal most to the voters of the 
moderate left, while Chirac presented himself his as more business and 
'middle class' friendly, which should be compared to his opportunistic 
positioning during the 1995 presidential election campaign against economic 
orthodoxy and the constraints of the EMU project.  In 1995, Chirac had to 
position himself in relation to his challenger on the Right, Edouard Balladur, 
who defended the financial orthodoxy of the Minc Report.  Then Chirac 
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presented himself as the candidate to heal the social divisions in French 
society, divisions aggravated by record unemployment levels and real 
interest rates.
8
  In 2002, the political and economic conditions did not 
require such a position.  The principal economic policy differences between 
Jospin and Chirac and the Socialist Party / UMP camps had to do with tax 
and the European constraint.  With regard to the former, Chirac and the 
UMP played the more traditional tune of the Right promising significant 
cuts to a tax-exhausted middle class.  With regard to the latter, Chirac and 
the UMP took a more ambiguous line:  accepting the need for budgetary 
restraint and accepting the desirability of the goal of balanced budgets while 
refusing to commit to the balanced budget goal of 2004, to which the Jospin 
Government had agreed.  Therefore — and this has to be the most 
significant irony of the electoral campaign — Jospin and the Socialists 
found themselves — uncomfortably — in the completely reverse position 
from where it had been in the Spring of 1997:  defending the constraining 
rules of EMU and the Stability Pact which it had previously attacked in its 
campaign for a 'euro social'.
9
  Thus, while the 1995 presidential and 1997 
legislative elections centred very much around economic matters and the 
EMU constraint, this constraint proved something of an embarrassment for 
the presidential candidates and their parties, and they chose to largely steer 
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clear of the matter.  At a superficial level, Chirac's supporters emphasised 
Jospin's core socialist values which posed a danger to the competitivity of 
French business and thus economic growth.  Chirac denounced the 
‘insidious statism of the government’.
10
  He argued that the Socialists were 
stuck in the past, adhering to a model abandoned by most European social 
democrats.  In the meantime, Jospin's supporters accused Chirac of making 
promises he could not fulfil (especially on tax cuts).     
 
Tax 
Tax cuts were the most important economic policy reform on offer from 
Chirac and the Raffarin Interim Government.  Based on the over-optimistic 
forecast of 3 per cent economic growth (and the 1.8 per cent deficit for 2002 
predicted — also over-optimistically — by Laurent Fabius), Chirac 
promised that a future UMP government would bring about cuts in income 
taxes by a third over the life of the parliament (2002 to 2007) starting with 
an immediate cut of 5 per cent in 2002; would lower corporate taxes to the 
EU average during the same period; and would cut VAT payments for 
specific sectors, notably hotels, restaurants and catering.  Chirac and the 
UMP targeted the French middle classes with these cuts (only the 17 million 
wealthiest of the 32 million households in France pay income tax).  For 
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poorer households, Chirac offered only a cut of 2 billion off the total 
collected from the residential tax.  Francis Mer, the UMP interim 
government finance minister, sought to prove to a sceptical French public 
that the government would find the means to bring about these cuts.  Mer 
wanted to demonstrate prior to the elections that Chirac would respect his 
election promises — unlike his failure to do so in 1995.  Closer to the 
legislative elections, in June, Mer argued for the lowering of VAT on the 
hotel and restaurant sector (just as VAT had previously been lowered on 
domestic work) in an open letter to Frits Bolkestein, the European 
Commissioner responsible for fiscal policy.  Mer recognised that this was a 
EU matter that could only be achieved at the EU level but he sought to 
initiate the decision making process to demonstrate the government’s 
commitment on this matter.
11
  A few days earlier, one of the interim 
government’s finance ministers, Jean-Jacques Aillagon, argued for the 
lowering of VAT on CDs!  Obviously, the right targeted business and the 
middle class which would decrease government revenues by a total of €30 
billion (£20 billion). 
Jospin and the Socialists challenged Chirac and the UMP, calling their 
tax cutting plans unworkable, especially given the spending constraints 
imposed by the Stability Pact (see below).  However, the total proposed cuts 
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by Jospin — amounting to 18 billion euro, albeit incorporating 4.28 billion 
in cuts set for 2003 already announced by the government in the Fabius Plan 
— might also have been called unworkable, based as they were on 
excessively high growth forecasts.  However, Jospin and the Socialists 
claimed themselves to be more responsible than Chirac and the UMP in that 
the additional cuts in taxes by a future Socialist-led government would only 
take place from 2004, to allow the government to respect its European 
deficit cutting commitments.  Jospin resisted the pressures from the ‘social-
liberal' wing within the party (led by Laurent Fabius) to promise greater tax 
cuts for the middle classes.  Jospin called for tax decreases that would 
'reconcile the middle classes and lower classes'
12
 brought about by a 5 billion 
euro break for those who paid income tax while the break would be designed 
to benefit poorer taxpayers considerably more than the wealthier ones) and 
providing 5 billion for those who did not pay tax through an increase in the 
'prime pour l'emploi (PPE).  Created in 2001, the PPE is a tax credit granted 
to the poorest workers (paid between .3 and 1.4 times the SMIC).  Its 
beneficiaries — some 8.5 million workers — are for the most part (70 per 
cent) exonerated from paying tax.  Jospin emphasised economic and political 
balance, understanding well the great reticence of the majority within his 
own party with regard to the lowering of income tax.  Jospin also promised 
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to diminish by half the residential tax which he considered 'the most archaic 
and unjust tax' by a total amount of 4.3 billion euros (more than twice the cut 
offered by Chirac).  For the remainder of the presidential pack, the right-
wing candidates uniformly called for income and corporate tax cuts, while 
left-wing candidates insisted upon at least the maintenance of existing tax 
rates and in most cases a steeper progression in income tax. 
 Other tax issues were the subject of less important partisan debate.  
On capital gains tax – high in France in comparison to other EU member 
states — candidates of the right predictably recommended a drop.  Chirac 
argued that the Plural Left had increased this tax excessively, that it needed 
to be lowered sensitively to encourage investment in the more productive 
sectors of the economy.  Bayrou called for the tax to be lowered but in the 
context of a harmonisation with the other EU member states.  Addressing the 
small and medium sized businessmen of France, Le Pen called for a more 
progressive capital gains tax.  Madelin proposed the complete elimination of 
the tax.  Candidates on the left (Chevènement, Hue, Besancenot, Laguiller) 
generally favoured the maintenance of the tax at at least current levels, 
arguing that gains on capital should not be treated more favourably than 
gains on work.  Chevènement recommended a Tax Schengenland to 
maintain higher taxes in parts of the EU wanting to maintain them.  Mamère 
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and the Greens took a relatively unique line on taxes with a considerable 
decrease in their total number and simplification to decrease the cost of tax 
collection and tax evasion, while insisting upon tax relief on investments in 
eco-friendly economic developments. 
 France’s wealth tax (Impôt sur la fortune (ISF)) has excited debate 
that far exceeds its significance in terms of revenue collected for the 
government (approximately 1 per cent but more than doubling in total value 
from 1990 to 2001).  It is a symbolically important tax.  Most of the Left — 
except the Greens which sought to do away with the ISF for reasons of 
simplicity in the tax regime — did not envisage to reduce it (at least 
officially).  The Far Left sought to increase it dramatically, especially for the 
wealthiest.  Fabius had tried to convince Jospin to lower it to prevent capital 
flight, at the risk of sparking opposition within the Plural Left Government.  
However, Jospin suppressed a report on the matter submitted by the 
Fabiusien deputy, Michel Charzat on 12 July 2001.  Jospin steered clear of 
the matter during the election campaign, while other candidates of the Left 
argued in favour of its expansion, and Chevènement its application to works 
of art (Chevènement thus being the only candidate to adopt the specific 
recommendation of the Council of Taxes).  Most of the Right — Bayrou, 
Madelin, Le Pen — sought to reform the tax significantly on the grounds 
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that it encouraged capital flight and the departure of companies.  Chirac, 




Government spending — and abiding by the EU Stability and Growth 
Pact  
At the 16 March European Council summit, President Chirac and Prime 
Minister Jospin confirmed France’s commitment to bring public finances 
'close to balance or in surplus' by 2004.  In the domestic political debate, 
Chirac qualified his commitment to this goal given his promises on tax cuts 
but also, it might be suspected, to demonstrate traditional Gaullist disdain 
for any external (European) constraint on domestic policy.  Furthermore, 
Chirac was wary of the experience of the mid-1990s when the Juppé 
Government was forced to increase VAT by 2 points to satisfy the 
Maastricht criteria, a move that contributed to the Right’s defeat in the 1997 
legislative elections.  Chirac indicated on several occasions that France's 
pledge to her European partners and the Commission to balance the budget 
by 2004 would have to be put back to 2007 to allow for his spending plans.  
In direct contradiction to Chirac's commitment of 16 March.  Chirac's camp 
calculated that his programmes and increased pension costs would increase 
state spending by €35 billion.  However, his opponents argued that it would 
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cost a great deal more (€56bn (£34.5bn).
14
  The European Commission in 
the meantime predicted a French deficit of 1.9 for 2002.
15
  In the lead-up to 
the legislative elections, at the 4 June Eurogroup meeting  of Euro-zone 
finance ministers, Francis Mer sought to persuade his Euro-zone 
counterparts to postpone debate on national economic policy guidelines until 
after the French elections.
16
  As with Chirac, Mer made careful use of 
language: 
 
C'est l'objectif qui compte (celui de l'assainissement budgétaire), ce n'est 
pas tel ou tel chiffre précis, tel ou tel pourcentage.  Ne nous accrochons pas 
à une date symbole. … Il faudra qu'avec quelques autres pays on essaye de 
trouver un langage commun …, quitte à le faire dans des termes qui 
permettent d'assurer le maintien du cap sans forcément être obligé de 





Nonetheless, Mer maintained France's commitment to respecting the date:  
 
Si l'on veut, l'on peut.  C'est une question de choix, c'est une question de 
décisions, c'est une question de volonté.  Tout est possible à condition de ne 
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Raffarin and Mer would not have appreciated the public declarations of the 
German Finance Minister, Hans Eichel, who assured that he would not raise 
‘le petit doigt’ to help France in its spending path.
19
 
Like Chirac's calculations, Jospin's policies assumed, over 
optimistically, that economic growth would reach an average of 3 per cent 
over the following five years.  Jospin insisted on sticking to the 2004 
schedule to balance the public budget, while claiming that public spending 
would rise on average 1.5 per cent a year.  To have any chance at success in 
balancing the budget, Jospin would have had to consecrate the entirety of his 
margin of manoeuvre created by economic growth from 2002 to 2004 to 
lowering the public spending deficit.  Only after that date would he begin to 
put into effect his tax cutting plan.  Jospin presented himself as the 
responsible candidate, who might be tying the governments hand, but only 
doing so temporarily. 
As for the other candidates, most of those on the Left and Right 
refused to commit France to the European constraint.  The pro-European 
Bayrou called for France to respect the goals of the Stability Pact.  However, 
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Bayrou certainly did not publicly embrace the policy views of two former 
UDF finance ministers (Jean Arthuis and Edmond Alphandery) who had 
advocated, when in opposition, a balanced budget requirement on current 
expenditure and the extension of parliamentary control over aspects of the 
budget (to check supplementary expenditure by the government).
20
  This was 
not a policy position raised in the presidential or legislative election 
campaign. 
 
The 35 hour week and employment policy 
Even with the substantial drop in unemployment over the previous five 
years, interventionist employment creation measures remained a rallying cry 
for the left-wing candidates in the presidential and legislative elections.  
While the right tended to steer clear of such interventionism — with 
Madelin and Le Pen deriding it — some interventionist measures were also 
advocated by right-wing candidates.  Chirac promised to prolong the 
emplois-jeunes posts created under the Plural Left Government.  Lionel 
Jospin and the Socialist Party emphasised the need for additional measures 
to stimulate job creation, spending extra government revenues on improved 
job training schemes, 900,000 new jobs pledged through to 2007, including 
200,000 for unemployed workers over 50 (contrats de retour à  l’emploi). 
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 Most of the presidential candidates and parties accepted the 
continuation of the 35 hour week.  Some of those on the Left defended it — 
although Chevènement called for the softening of its application with the 
hours worked beyond 35 remunerated at a higher rate.  Having attacked the 
policy since its creation as an economically non-sensical measure, most of 
the candidates of the Right, including Chirac, called for a relaxed application 
of the policy, recognising that a full elimination of the policy would be 
problematic.  Only Madelin and Le Pen called for the complete elimination 
of the 35 hour week policy — with a return to at the very least, the previous 
39 hour week. 
A few of the right-wing presidential candidates (including Bayrou) 
also continued with the traditional offer of a reduction of social charges 
imposed on companies that hired additional staff.  Chirac offered a relief in 
the payment of social charges amounting to 6 billion euro, targeted 
specifically at workers on lower salaries and younger workers with less than 
two years of post-secondary study.  Left-wing candidates, including Jospin, 
did not pursue this policy line which many considered to have been 
exhausted as an effective mechanism to reduce employment.  
 Serge July for his part asked about the role of the 35 week policy in 
Jospin’s defeat of 21 April,
21
 given the importance of this policy as 
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‘emblematic’ of the Left.  July argued that the policy worked to the 
advantage only of white collar managerial staff, the majority of which 
increased their salaries in 2001 while profiting from the reduction in total 
working time.  Workers in those big companies where trade unions were in a 
position of relative strength also profited.   The majority of workers, 
however, suffered:  those in the civil service  — where strikes had been 
widespread — those in the hospital sector, but most of all those working in 
small and medium sized companies (petites et moyennes entreprises, PME) 
who were hit hard by the annualisation of the 35 hour week allowed under 
the law, salary freezes and a drastic limitation of supplementary hours.  The 
35 hour week thus contributed to social divisions rather than reducing them 
and, according to July, greatly eroded the trust of a large section of moderate 
left-wing  voters in Jospin and the Socialist-led government. 
The rigidities of the French labour market are normally signalled out 
by Anglo-American observers as one of the major causes of high levels of 
structural unemployment in the country — along with the relatively high 
minimum wage.  In the 2002 campaigns, only the Thatcherite candidate 
Alain Madelin dared to call for the liberalisation of the French labour 
market.  The matter gained some electoral significance following the 14 
January ruling of the Constitutional Council against article 107 of the 
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Government’s law of social modernisation (‘loi de modernisation sociale’) 
adopted in parliament on 19 December 2001.  Robert Hue and the PCF 
coalition partners insisted upon this article as a vital protection for staff 
against ‘ruthless’ firings, after the massive lay-offs by M&S and Danone 
over the previous two years.  The article redefined the field of application of 
'licensiement économique' (mass firing for economic reasons) only 
authorising such redundancies in three cases:  when 'all other means have 
been exhausted to overcome serious economic difficulties’, when 
'technological change puts at risk the survival of the company', and in the 
case of 'necessities of indispensable reorganisation to ensure the survival of 
the company’ (author’s translation).  The PS leadership almost certainly 
allowed the inclusion of article 107 as a political gesture to the PCF, while 
predicting that the Constitutional Council would find this to be 
unconstitutional.  Fabius stated publicly that article 107 was fundamentally 
problematic for investment and employment but its inclusion was necessary 
for political reasons to mollify the PCF anxious to demonstrate its left-wing 
credentials to its increasingly disillusioned electorate. On 26 October 2001, 
fifty-six directors of the biggest French companies had called on the 
government to reject article 107 (including those directors with strong links 
to the Socialist Party) which further promised to transform the issue into a 
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battle cry for the PCF and other left-wing parties anxious to distance 
themselves from the Socialists in the upcoming election campaigns.  The 
Constitutional Council found the article to be contrary to freedom of 
enterprise and inherently dangerous to the competitiveness of the company 
so that its existence would be menaced.  Both Hue and Mamère announced 
their outrage at the Council’s decision, deemed ‘reactionary’ and ‘a 
provocation’, with Hue accusing the Council of ‘espousing the ultraliberal 
theses of the Right and the MEDEF’ and demanding that the Government 
submit a new text — which it did not.
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  Hue, Mamère and the candidates of 
the Far Left campaigned on this matter, Hue calling for an amendment of the 
French constitution if necessary. 
Raising the minimum wage (the SMIC) has long been a component of 
many election campaign platforms by right and left-wing candidates and 
parties.  In 2002, the candidates of the right entirely resisted the temptation 
to promise an increase in the SMIC.  In a 1 June interview with the 
newspaper Ouest France, Raffarin argued that an increase of SMIC would 
only be considered with a full review of the consequences of this action on 
the economic situation and above all on employment, with a decision to be 
taken during the third week of June after consultations with the social 
partners,
23
 which effectively was another way of discounting any probability 
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of an increase.  In the run-up to the legislative elections, quite late in the 
campaign, the Socialists resorted to the SMIC weapon:  promising that the 
minimum wage would be increased 5 per cent if the Left was to win the 
elections.  The Socialists emphasised how this increase would add to the 
already considerable benefit created by the increase in the PPE and the drop 
in the tax rate imposed on lower salaried workers.  Presidential candidates 
further to the left promised at least as much.  Chevènement and the PR 




With an ageing population, the future provision of pensions has been one of 
the most pressing economic issues facing France (like most West European 
countries).  It is a particularly sensitive policy area for any government as 
reform suggests a decreased take home salary, undermines the ‘solidarity’ 
principle of the existing ‘répartition’ system and even potentially involves 
the rise in the retirement age.  In 1991, Michel Rocard noted that pension 
reform was capable of destroying five or six governments which would have 
to deal with it.  However, the last significant reform to pensions was in 
1993, when the Balladur Government increased the number of contribution 
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years in the private sector from 37.5 to 40 years.  The efforts of the Juppé 
Government to bring about further reform — notably in the public sector — 
were blocked by the protests of late 1995.  The development of private 
pensions funds — in addition to the existing mandatory contribution system 
of ‘répartition’ — has become a major battleground in party political debate:  
the further to the left the more opposed to the encouragement of any private 
system through tax relief.  Pensions, for most of the mainstream presidential 
candidates, was a pressing issue which they claimed would be a priority of 
their quinquennat.  On 12 February 2002, the EU Council of Ministers 
entered into the fray by issuing a statement announcing that it was 
indispensable for France to reform its pension system, especially given that 
pension funds did not appear in the government budget and thus a shortfall 
— set to increase as a larger proportion of the population entered retirement 
— was effectively a hidden contribution to the public deficit. Both Jospin 
and Chirac accepted the need to provide tax relief to encourage people to 
save for their retirement.  However, both candidates — in particular Jospin 
— had to maintain great caution on the matter, defending the existing 
system of ‘répartition’ as the main system for the provision of pensions.  
The idea of capitalisation had progressed on the Centre-Left — promoted by 
the ‘social-liberal’ modernisers — but there remained significant differences 
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with the Right.  In the 1995 presidential debate, Chirac defended a 
complementary regime encouraging private pensions savings.  Jospin 
however stated that he opposed a pension fund system, because this was not 
mutualiste and thus escaped the control of the social partners and it 
amounted to the introduction, despite Chirac’s rhetoric, of a system of 
private insurance.  In 1997, the Juppé Government adopted a 'proposition de 
loi instaurant les fonds de pension', the Thomas law (named after the UDF 
deputy, Jean-Pierre Thomas).  But the victory of the Plural Left in the 
legislative elections brought an end to this reform.  The decrees of the 
Thomas law were never published and the law was abrogated in 2001.   
However, over the life of the Jospin Government, the Socialists modified 
their position on the matter.  In a December 1997 interview in Les Echos, 
Jospin declared that 'the government is not hostile to measures favouring 
savings for retirement'.
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  He even added:  'No one challenges the idea that 
private sector workers can dispose of “sur-complementary” retirement 
regimes, that is to say pension funds' (provocatively using the term so 
despised on the Left).  The Jospin Government did not remain totally inert 
on the matter. In 1999, the Government created a fund which was to be used 
to compensate for part of the shortfall in the existing pension schemes (the 
Fonds de réserve des retraites, which consisted of 12 billion by the end of 
 31 
2002, to rise to 152 billion by 2020).  To involve the social partners in 
preparing the terrain for a future, more significant reform, Jospin created the 
permanent Comité d'orientation des retraites (COR) in the spring of 2000, 
chaired by Yannick Moreau, which submitted a report to the Prime Minister 
in December 2001, with the aim of outlining the existing situation.  Despite 
the boycott of the MEDEF, the COR made progress and was set to take on 
the issue of capitalisation in September 2002.  Jospin’s own Conseil 
d’Analyse Economique (a body of economic advisors attached to Matignon) 
examined the matter as did a group led by Bernard Quintreau, which 
presented its report on 14 March 2002.  Despite these reports and various 
recommendations, Jospin himself was highly cautious on the matter of 
pensions during the presidential election campaign.  The other development 
in government policy came from Bercy.  The Fabius Law, adopted in 
February 2001, installed, the 'plan partenarial d'épargne salariale 
volontaire' (PPESV).  This law permitted salaried employees in the private 
sector to build up savings over 10 years or longer.  Officially, it was not a 
pension fund, but the savings formula, long in duration and voluntary, very 
much resembled a pension fund.  Trade Union opposition to the introduction 
of complementary private plans was also gradually eroded and four unions 
(CGT, CFDT, CFTC and CGC) created at the start of 2002, a 'comité 
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intersyndical pour l'épargne salariale', demonstrating that they were no 
longer hostile to cautious pension reform.  Only Force Ouvrière maintained 
its opposition to any new pensions saving regime which was seen as an 
attempt by the government to gradually supplement the payments from the 
‘répartition’ system with private savings. 
During the 2002 presidential election campaign, most of the 
candidates were rather vague on the details of how they would set about 
reforming pensions.  Public scepticism with regard to private schemes had 
been intensified by the Enron scandal in the US.  Jospin defended the 
existing system but opened the possibility of the further encouragement of 
complementary regimes, while officially opposing the creation of ‘private’ 
pension regimes.  Jospin promised, as the first major action of a new 
Socialist-led Government, the organisation of a conference with the social 
partners to discuss the matter.  Chirac was somewhat braver on pensions, 
defending the French system of ‘répartition’ and existing complementary 
state funds, he also called for ‘fonds de pension à la française’:  a third stage 
of retirement fund, based on capitalisation.  Chirac hit out against Jospin 
regularly on the pensions matter, claiming that the Plural Left Government 
had done nothing to reform the existing system or address the looming 
pensions crisis. Some other candidates on the Right — Bayrou and Madelin 
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— were even more direct in their support for the encouragement of private 
pensions, pointing out the irony that only civil servants currently benefited 
from a special fiscal regime designed to encourage them to save for their 
retirement.  Only Le Pen and Megret hit on the demographic element of the 
problem, calling for greater government assistance to raise the birth rate.  
Unsurprisingly, most candidates of the left defended the existing system and 
opposed the development of private pensions savings schemes.  However, 
Mamère and the Greens accepted the need to keep existing voluntary 
contribution regimes but also to examine future voluntary mechanisms but 
only in tight consultation with the social partners with a clear focus on the 
impact upon the ‘répartition’ system.  All the candidates maintained a 
similar line on the need to involve the social partners actively in any future 
pension reform. 
 
The remaining confetti of the former state owned empire 
Nationalisation, privatisation or the invitation of private sector capital to 
fund publicly owned companies had long been major issues of contention 
during presidential and legislative elections.  With most former publicly 
owned companies and banks privatised or progressively opened to private 
sector capital during the 1980s and 1990, this issue was no longer in the 
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ideologically charged realm that it had previously been.  Most of the Left 
accepted that renationalisation was not an option.  However, the need to 
defend public utilities against their dismantling by European competition 
policies and EU governments anxious to gain access to the French market 
had long been a matter of consensus between the Left and much of the 
Right, with even the relatively liberal Balladur Government making a 
vigorous defence of the maintenance of French public utility monopolies in 
debates with the European partners.  However, governments of both the left 
and right were tempted into attracting private sector capital for these utilities 
in order to cover their massive investment needs without contributing the 
public sector deficit.  In 2002, most of the candidates of the Left continued 
to make a spirited defence of the two big remaining public utilities — 
Electricité de France (EDF) and Gaz de France (GDF).  Chevènement, Hue, 
Mamère and others argued that France must insist upon a derogatory clause 
at the EU level to maintain its remaining publicly owned services on 
grounds of social justice:  the provision of gas and electricity not to be 
subject to market forces and thus potential price rises which would hit lower 
income households disproportionately.  Left-wing candidates allied 
themselves with the trade unions which were for the most part adamantly 
opposed to the capitalisation of the two companies and the workers’ loss of 
 35 
their protective civil servant status.  Socialist policy, however, had shifted 
over the previous five years.  Jospin — aware of the massive investment 
needs of these companies — embraced the ‘social-liberal’ policy advocated 
by Fabius, calling for the capitalisation of these two companies while 
retaining for the state the majority share.  It is likely that the social-liberals 
in the government wanted to go further toward full privatisation but political 
niceties and the threat of an inevitable trade union backlash prevented them 
from calling for this.  Policy positions on the Centre-Right had similarly 
shifted.  Chirac and Bayrou called for these public utilities to be opened to 
capitalisation while still insisting upon the state as majority shareholder. 
 
A failure to spell out a coherent economic vision of the future 
Only the candidates and parties of the Extreme Left and the liberal Madelin 
might be considered to have presented a coherent overall vision of the 
desirable development of France’s economy.  The overall economic policy 
direction of the Socialists remained in flux with substantial differences 
within the party on nearly all major economic matters of the day.  Jospin’s 
presidential programme was prepared by members of the ‘modernising’ 
wing of the Socialist party (Alain Bergougnioux, Vincent Peillon, Marisol 
Touraine, Pierre Moscovici, Alain Richard and Gilles Finchelstein) linked to 
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either the Jospin-Rocardian club Socialisme et Démocratie or the ‘social-
liberal’ think tank, the Jean Jaurès Foundation, and the ideas of Strauss-
Kahn and Fabius, the ‘modernisers’ who continued in their attempt to pull 
the party in a ‘social-liberal’ direction.  At the same time, Jospin consulted 
the fourteen heavyweights of the Socialist Party on his platform as a 
diplomatic exercise to diminish potential conflict within the party.  Jospin’s 
own document appeared to eclipse that of the PS prepared by the more left-
wing Martin Aubry.  In January, the former and current finance ministers 
published their own policy statements: Strauss-Kahn’s La Flamme et la 
Cendre was a four hundred page essay on socialism in the Twenty-first 
century, France, European and globalisation;
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 while Fabius’ 'Laurent 
Fabius 2002-2007:  les chantiers de la Gauche moderne' (published by the 
Jean Jaurès Foundation) focused on the needed policies for the next 5 
years.
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  Fabius praised Jospin and the record of the government — while 
ignoring the difficulties of the 35 hour week policy — but also recognised 
the difficulties facing the French economy and need to reinforce the relations 
among the social partners to bring about further reform.  Fabius also directly 
challenged the political constraints created by the Plural Left alliance, 
encouraging Jospin not to make promises that could not be kept or delay 
future reforms so to avoid upsetting coalition partners.  Fabius outlined a 
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series of reforms that he hoped Jospin would agree with:  pension reform, 
with increased years of contributions in the public sector, the encouragement 
of voluntary savings for retirement to complement existing schemes, the 
partial and sensible replacement of retiring civil servants and the ‘evolution’ 
of the status of the two public utilities, GDF and EDF, with the state 
remaining the majority share-holder.  Many of these policy proposals were 
taken up by Jospin in his own campaign platform, Je m’engage, presented to 
the public two months later on 18 March — albeit within the context of 
Jospin’s own ‘modern socialism’ versions of the ‘Third Way’ (a term with 
which he refused to be associated). 
Chirac’s own policy positions were drawn up by a cabal of his 
advisers at the Elysée with a small number of loyalists in the RPR, without 
any broad consultation in his party.  However, Chirac’s own positioning on 
economic policy demonstrated a certain schizophrenia:  on the one hand he 
advocated cautiously liberalising economic policies, while at the same time 
he refused to be associated with the term liberal, distancing himself 
markedly from Alain Madelin but also certain close allies within the RPR — 
notably Nicholas Sarkozy —  widely associated with the liberal right.  
Chirac mixed free market ideas alongside state interventionism, while 
leaning rhetorically in favour of the former.  He placed emphasis upon 
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individual initiative, work and merit rather than state assistance. He sought 
to lower taxes and charges on companies with simplification of 
administrative procedures with the aim of creating a million companies in 
one year.
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  Playing traditional Gaullist cards, Chirac resisted the European 
constraint and promised more spending on law and order and defence 
(notably with the construction of a second French aircraft carrier). 
Thoughtful discussion on the necessary development of the 
appropriate role of the State in the economy — views on which would shape 
policies on most specific aspects on economic policy discussed above — 
was virtually absent during the presidential and legislative campaigns.  One 
leading French philosopher, Alain Touraine spelled out the nature of the 
issue in a Le Monde article published a few weeks prior to the first round of 
the presidential elections.
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  In his article, Touraine argued that the major 
issue dividing the candidates was how to reconcile the maintenance of a part 
of public institutions (in particular social security) with the greater 
acceptance of the laws of the market and the determination of which modes 
of State intervention to be rejected and which to be proposed.  On this issue 
there are three possible positions: to defend the ancient forms of intervention 
of the State; or to adopt a liberalism that limits the most possible the role of 
the State; to refuse both the old administered economy and extreme 
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liberalism and to search out new forms of useful State intervention.  
Touraine challenged the first two positions as highly problematic.  The 
defence of the 'public sector' in the name of the 'public service' corresponds 
to the interest of numerous people (especially those working in the public 
sector) but maintaining the current role of the State simply to defend the 
interests of those working in it is obviously wrong.  Liberalism was simply 
not possible politically:  any candidate proposing the dismantling of social 
security would be immediately eliminated.   
Touraine argued in favour of examining ‘new forms of State 
intervention' with three core principles in mind.  First, intervention must 
diminish inequality.  Second, the social objectives and economic goals of the 
State must recognise that the more a society is advanced the more non-
economic factors of economic growth are important (as recognised by most 
economists, a leading example being Robert Solow).  To Touraine, the 
increasingly central economic issue for France in the years to come is 
education, since the level of education will determine the quantity and 
quality of choices offered to individuals.  Third, there exists no necessary 
reason for the State to manage all public goods.  Many European countries 
combine different forms of management more effectively than France:  
private, associative, cooperative, local and state.  Many French universities 
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(officially public institutions) managed themselves already with an almost 
totally autonomous control over their resources.  This third principle is 
supported by the public’s demand for further decentralisation.   
Where must the state continue to intervene?  What are the domains of 
collective and individual life that must be managed by the market?  What are 
the new priorities to assign to government intervention?  It is particularly 
difficult to combine in a coherent and realistic manner answers to these 
questions.  None of the presidential candidates succeeded in doing so and 
Chirac and Jospin were particularly obfuscatory, focusing instead on 
politically sensitive tinkering.  The former’s complaints of embedded 
‘socialism’ in France and the latter’s defence of a ‘modern socialism’ against 
the ravages of global capitalism amounted to little more than vague rhetoric. 
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